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SAFE HAVEN, ADOPTION AND BIRTH RECORD LAWS:
WHERE ARE THE DADDIES?
t
JEFFREY A. PARNESS* & THERESE A. CLARKE ARADO

INTRODUCTION

In this Paper we explore the difficulties in American state safe haven,
adoption and birth record laws, crystallized in the question: "Where are the
daddies?" After briefly reviewing safe haven laws, we demonstrate how
paternity interests are unreasonably, if not unconstitutionally, foreclosed
when children are abandoned by their mothers. Comparable paternity
losses due to maternal acts are then shown in adoption and birth record
laws. Lost daddies are unwarranted because laws should not allow
maternal privacy rights and interests to so easily foreclose chances for
responsible fatherhood, especially in settings where births result from
consensual sex between unwed partners. We conclude with suggestions on
paternity law reforms.
I.

SAFE HAVEN LAWS AND LOST PATERNITY

A. Equalityfor Mothers andFathers
The pursuit of greater equality between genetic mothers and genetic
fathers, regardless of marital status, has long been an important American
goal.' For example, in 2003 in Rosero v. Blake2 the North Carolina
Supreme Court eliminated the common law rule that the custody of a non-

Copyright © 2007, Jeffrey A. Parness & Therese A. Clarke Arado.
* Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. J.D., The University of
Chicago; B.A., Colby College. An earlier version of this Paper was presented at the Third
Annual Wells Conference on Adoption Law under the title, "Safe Haven Laws: Where Are
the Daddies?" The conference was held at Capital University Law School on February 15,

2007 under the title, "No Parent Left Behind: Fathers' Rights in Adoption."
I Associate Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. J.D., The John
Marshall Law School; M.L.S., Dominican University; B.B.A., Loyola University of
Chicago.
1 We do not herein explain the merit in our underlying assumption that, at least for
children born as a result of consensual sex, i.e., no rape or other violence or fear of harm,
usually there should be a mother and a father under law. On the value of two parents for
each child, see, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig and Steven L. Lock, "Legal Status and Effects on
Children," available at SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=973826 (2007).
2 Rosero v. Blake, 581 S.E.2d 41 (N.C. 2003).
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marital child presumptively vests in the mother.3 Relying on U.S. Supreme
Court rulings, the court said "absent a showing that the biological or
adoptive parents are unfit, that they have otherwise neglected their
children's welfare, or that some other compelling reason exists, the
paramount rights of both parents to the companionship, custody, care and
control of their minor children must prevail." 4 The North Carolina court
concluded, "the father's right to custody of his illegitimate child is legally
equal to that of the child's mother.",5 In an earlier U.S. Supreme Court
case, Stanley v. Illinois,6 the Court in 1972 found equal protection
violations in a statute declaring that children whose genetic mother had
died had no "surviving parent" because their genetic father had never
married their mother, though the father had lived off and on with her for
eighteen years
and had undertaken
significant childrearing
responsibilities.7
Today, there are many express statutes on the desired equality between
female and male parents. For example, an Illinois Probate Act provision
says:
If both parents of a minor are living and are competent
to transact their own business and are fit persons, they are
entitled to the custody of the person of the minor and the
direction of his education. If one parent is dead and the
surviving parent is competent to transact his own business
and is a fit person, he is similarly entitled. The parents
have equal powers, rights and duties concerning the
minor.8
A Delaware Domestic Relations provision says:
The father and mother are the joint natural guardians of
their minor child and are equally charged with the child's
support, care, nurture, welfare and education. Each has
equal powers and duties with respect to such child, and
neither has any right, or presumption of right or fitness,
superior to the right of the other .... Where the parents
3

1d. at50.
4 Id. at 47.
5

1d. at50.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
7
Id. at 657-58.
8 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-7 (1993).
6

2007]

WHERE ARE THE DADDIES?
live apart, the Court may award the custody of their minor
child to either of them and neither shall benefit from any
presumption of being better suited for such award. 9

These equality principles have resulted in American governmental
policies favoring two parents under law at birth for each child born as a
result of consensual sex, whether or not the genetic parents were ever
married to one another. Birth record laws automatically recognize women
giving birth as mothers under law. 10 As to legal fathers, American laws
usually presume the husbands of married mothers are the genetic fathers.1'
Where the mothers are unmarried, a California Family Code provision
illustrates the two parent goals. It says:
There is a compelling state interest in establishing
paternity for all children. Establishing paternity is the first
step toward a child support award, which, in turn, provides
children with equal rights and access to benefits,
including, but not limited to, social security, health
insurance, survivors' benefits, military benefits, and
inheritance rights .... Additionally, knowing one's father
is important to a child's development.12
With unwed mothers, the genetic fathers are usually subject to paternity
designations. 13
Notwithstanding the cases and statutes on equality, there is not, and
should not be, absolute or near absolute equality between unwed genetic
parents, nor between unmarried and married heterosexual couples, who
have children the old-fashioned way.
There are some necessary
inequalities in American maternity and paternity laws. Differing treatment
of unwed women and men in governmental procedures for designating
9 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,

§ 701(a) (1999).

10See, e.g., Amy G. v. M.W., 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 297, 303-04 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)
(reviewing state parentage act) and CAL. FAM. CODE § 7610(a) (West 1992) (parent and
child relationship established by proof of woman giving birth).
1 Relevant marriages can occur during pregnancy, or even after pregnancy at times, as
well as prior to conception. Compare, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(1) (1993) (born or
conceived during marriage) with (a)(2) (postbirth marriage and man's name on birth
certificate).
12 CAL. FAM. CODE § 7570(a) (1992).
13 W. Craig Williams, Note, The Paradox ofPaternityEstablishment:As Rights Go Up,
Rates Go Down, 8 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 261, 266-68 (1997).
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parent-child connections based on genetic ties was condoned by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 2001 in Nguyen v. INS. 14 There the Court said:
The first governmental interest to be served is the
importance of assuring that a biological parent-child
relationship exists. In the case of the mother, the relation
is verifiable from the birth itself. The mother's status is
documented in most instances by the birth certificate or
hospital records and the witnesses who attest to her having
given birth.
In the case of the father, the uncontestable fact is that
he need not be present at the birth. If he is present,
furthermore, that circumstance is not incontrovertible
Fathers and mothers are not
proof of fatherhood ....
similarly situated with regard to the proof of biological
parenthood. The imposition of a different set of rules for
making that legal determination with respect to fathers and
mothers is neither surprising nor troublesome from a
constitutional perspective. 15
Differing treatment of unmarried and married heterosexual couples in
proof of paternity settings was condoned by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1989 in Michael H. v. Gerald D. 16 There the Court allowed American
states to create irrebuttable presumptions of paternity for husband within
marital couples, 17 though there need not be similar presumptions for
unmarried men within heterosexual couples. 18 Today there are many

4 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
ISId. at 62-63. See also Dubay v. Wells, 442 F. Supp. 2d 404, 406 (E.D. Mich. 2006)

(no constitutional right for a man to terminate child support duties, though a woman has the
right to abort).
16 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989).
"7 Id. at 129-30 ("It is a question of legislative policy and not constitutional law
whether California will allow the presumed parenthood of a couple desiring to retain a child
conceived within and born into their marriage to be rebutted."). The relevant state in
Michael H. was California, whose marital paternity presumption has since operated
differently, with both conclusive and rebuttable dimensions. See, e.g., Dawn D. v. Superior
Court, 952 P.2d 1139 (Cal. 1998) (conclusive where wife is cohabitating with her husband
who is neither impotent nor sterile; rebuttable where married couple is not cohabitating).
" Dawn D., 952 P.2d at 1141.
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marital paternity presumptions and far fewer paternity presumptions for the
unmarried. 19
B. UnwarrantedInequalities in Safe Haven Laws
Unfortunately, these equality principles have generally been ignored in
American state safe haven laws. Though often written in gender-neutral
terms, many safe haven laws now effectively permit the abandonment of
many newborns solely by genetic mothers regardless of paternity
interests. 20 These maternal acts usually foreclose any later legal
parenthood for genetic fathers who are fit and willing to parent, including
men who have attained federal constitutional childrearing rights through
marital presumptions or through providing child support. 21 Mothers can
walk away from parental responsibilities early on in a child's life, though
comparable desertions are usually forbidden for fathers in cases where

19 On marital paternity presumptions, covering marriage at conception, during
pregnancy, or immediately before birth, see, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(1) (1993)
("child is born or conceived during such marriage."). Those fewer paternity presumptions,
covering unmarried couples at conception, during pregnancy, or immediately before birth,
typically are also tied to marriage (occurring some time after birth). See, e.g., 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(2) (1993) (marriage after birth and man's name on birth certificate).
While there are many marital paternity presumptions nationwide, there are no marital
maternity presumptions (wife is the presumed mother of a child conceived by her husband
with another woman). Amy G., 142 Cal. App.4th, at 15 (married woman cannot be
presumed mother of child born to her husband's paramour who promptly asserted her own
maternity rights; no equal protection problems though unwed men at times can become
presumed fathers to children born to married women). Marital presumptions are reviewed
and criticized in Veronica Sue Gunderson, Personal Responsibility in Parentage: An
Argument Against the Marital Presumption, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y 335, 366
(2007) ("The marital presumption is outmoded, ineffective, and cumbersome due in large
part to the current modem technological ease of proving and disproving paternity. It...
sets up a system where women have nothing to lose by lying to their husbands and
boyfriends.... In the end, the parties that pay the high cost... [are] the wronged husband
and the unknowing child.")
20 See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in
the Culture of Life,
106 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 765 and 789-90 (2006). See also Laura Oren, Thwarted Fathers
or Pop-Up Pops?: How to Determine When Putative Fathers Can Block the Adoption of
Their Newborn Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 153, 189 (2006) ("infant abandonment laws are of
questionable constitutional validity" as they "create thwarted fathers by legal design who do
not enjoy even a modicum of procedural due process").
21 Oren, supra note 20, at 162-63.
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mothers maintain custody.2 2 Desertions are also foreclosed for mothers
once their children are a little older.2 3 Only the very, very young can be
abandoned, and only by mothers.24
American safe haven laws were chiefly enacted following the 1999
"Baby Moses" law in Texas. They were relatively noncontroversial and
typically justified on child protection grounds.26 They typically guarantee
anonymity to the relinquishers.27 Safe haven laws do vary somewhat from
state to state, differing on such matters as which children may be left28 (i.e.,
younger than three days, seven days, thirty days, ninety days, or three
29
hundred sixty days, and abused children); where children may be left
(i.e., hospitals only, or also at adoption agencies, or police or fire stations);
who may leave children 30 (i.e., genetic parent only, mother only, any
22

1d. at 188.
23Sanger, supra note 20, at 766.
24 id.
25 See,

e.g., Sanger, supra note 20, at 773-80 (noting that between 1999 and 2005 only

three state legislatures failed to pass safe haven laws and that in many places claims about
safe haven successes were "accepted uncritically").
26 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-1OA-3 (2007) ("It is the express purpose and intent of
the General Assembly in enacting this chapter ["Safe Place for Newborns"] to prevent
injuries to and deaths of newborn children that are caused by a mother who abandons the
newborn."); and Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-11-101 (2007) ("The purpose of this act ["Safety
for a Newborn Child"] is to provide to a parent of a newborn child the means to relinquish
the child so that the child may be cared for and protected in a safe haven.").
27See, e.g., Az. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3623.01(D) (2007) (relinquishing parent or agent
of parent can remain anonymous and need not give any information); IND. CODE § 31-342.5-1(c) (2007) (no obligation to disclose name of parent or child); W. VA. CODE § 49-6E-1
(2007) (government must respect desire to remain anonymous).
28 See, e.g., Az. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3623.01(G)(1) (2007) (infant under three days);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-58(a) (2007) (child under thirty days); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119,
§ 3912 (2007) (child under a week); N.M. STAT. § 24-22-3(A) (2007) (child under ninety
days and no evidence of child abuse); OR. REV. STAT. § 418.017(l)(a)-(b) (2007) (child
under thirty days and no evidence of abuse); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-1OA-4 (2007) ("no more
than one week old...."); IND. CODE § 31-9-2-0.5 (2007) (less than twelve months old).
29 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-34-202 (2007) (medical provider or law enforcement
agency); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-57 (2007) (hospital operating an emergency room); 325
ILL. COMP. STAT. LCS 2/20(a)-(c) (2007) (hospital, fire station, emergency medical facility
or police station); MINN. STAT. § 145.902(a) (2007) (licensed hospital); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 43-15-207 (2007) (licensed adoption agency).
30See, e.g., Az. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3623.01(B) (2007) (parent or agent of parent);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-304.5(1) (2007) (parent); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-1OA-4 (2007)
(continued)
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person, or any person with lawful custody); and, the procedures for
accepting children 3' (i.e., anonymity always, or may questions be asked by
the recipients?); and, the possibility of reunification of the newborn with
the person who abandons.32
Notwithstanding these variations, all American safe haven laws
effectively permit abandonment of newborns by mothers without requiring
these mothers to reveal much, if anything, about the fathers.33 Though
often written in gender-neutral terms, safe haven laws are almost
exclusively employed by new mothers.34 The lost fathers need not be
rapists or deadbeats. They can be married men with both genetic ties and
positive feelings about fatherhood who supported their wives through
pregnancy. They can be unmarried men who not only supported their
partners during pregnancy, but who also eagerly awaited fatherhood. In
most safe haven settings, the identities of genetic fathers will be
undiscoverable in later proceedings, although perhaps very relevant, as in
adoptions. For example, a West Virginia statute declares that a hospital
taking possession of an abandoned child from a parent "may not require"
the parent to identify himself or herself and shall "respect the person's
(mother); Mo. REV. STAT. § 210.950 (2),(3) (2007) (biological parent or person acting on
such parent's behalf); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-15, 100(b) (2007) (repealed) (parent or other
person having legal custody); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4018 (2007) ("person").
31 See, e.g., Az. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3623.01(D) (2007) (anonymity allowed);
GA.

CODE ANN. § 19-1 OA-4 (2007) (mother must show proof of her identity, if available, and
give a name and address); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.3517(A)(5) (West 2007) (if child
appears abused, identity of parents can be investigated); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-11 103(d)-109 (2007) (recipient can obtain, but not require, medical history and identity of
non-relinquishing parent); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4018(2) (person "may be
requested to provide information helpful to the welfare of the child", but may not be
detained if no information is given).
32 See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-405(2)(b) (2007) (sixty days to petition to regain

custody); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-15.8 (West 2007) (no duty "to attempt to reunite the
child with the child's parents"); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-8206(1) (2007) (before parental
rights are terminated).
33See Alayna Demartini, Unwed Dads Get State's Help FindingKids, THE COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, June 4, 2006, at Al, available at http://www.columbusdispatch.com/live/
contentbe/dispatch/2006/06/04/20060604-A1-05.html (mother gave child to adoption
agency and did not reveal father's identity).
34See id.; see also Tamar Lewin, Unwed Fathers Fightfor Babies Placedfor Adoption
by Mothers, N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, at A1, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2006/
03/19/national/19fathers.html (mother's attempt to put child up for adoption without
informing father she was pregnant).
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A New Mexico statute appears
desire to remain anonymous. 3 5
sympathetic to potential lost fathers, but ultimately provides little practical
help. It states: "A hospital may ask the person leaving the infant for the
name of the infant's biological father or biological mother, the infant's
the infant is
name and the infant's medical history, but the person leaving
36
hospital.
the
to
information
that
not required to provide
In Florida, safe haven procedures seemingly include requirements on
diligent searches for, and notices to, interested men.37 They also allow
potential lost fathers certain opportunities to void earlier parental rights
terminations or adoptions where a court finds persons "knowingly gave
false information that prevented the birth parent from timely making
known his or her desire to assume parental responsibilities toward the
minor or from exercising his or her parental rights. 38 However, another
Florida provision states that, except "where there is actual or suspected
child abuse or neglect, any parent who leaves a newborn infant ...and
expresses an intent to leave the newborn infant and not return, has the
absolute right to remain anonymous and to leave at any time and may not
be pursued. 39 Thus, under Florida laws, there are usually no real
opportunities for diligent searches for genetic fathers. By contrast, when a
mother places for adoption an older child in Florida, the proceeding to
terminate all parental rights in anticipation of a later adoption requires
judicial inquiry and, perhaps, an adoption entity search for the father.4°
Such a father includes a man married to the mother, a man who earlier
acknowledged paternity, or a man who cohabitated with the mother at the
time of conception. 4 1
There is much wrong with American safe haven laws allowing
newborn abandonment by mothers. While these laws might promote child
protection by allowing at-risk children to be placed in safety easily, and
thus, while some children might be saved from abuse or neglect or adopted
quickly, safe haven laws also promote the social norm that women can
comparably terminate the actual or potential childrearing interests of men
before and after birth. However, notwithstanding their prebirth abortion
35W. VA. CODE § 49-6E-1 (2007).
36
N.M.STAT. § 24-22-3(B) (2007).

STAT.

§ 63.0423(4) (2007).
§ 63.0423(9)(a) (2007).
§ 383.50(5) (2007).
§ 63.088(1)-(2) (2007).

41FLA. STAT.

§ 63.088(4)-(5) (2007).

37FLA.
38 FLA.
39FLA.
40 FLA.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
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rights under Roe v. Wade,42 women generally have never been accorded
veto powers over the childrearing interests of genetic fathers of children
born alive, especially where the women are unwed mothers whose
pregnancies resulted from consensual sexual intercourse. The result of a
safe haven maternal desertion and child abandonment is typically the loss
44
43
of a child to a genetic father and the loss of the genetic father to a child.
Safe haven laws effectively foreclose the benefits, but not necessarily the
financial obligations,4 5 of paternity. This is true even for men who
42

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (prior to the point of compelling necessity,

women have an unrestricted right to abortion).
43 Beyond public policies supporting the interest of men in their genetic offspring, there
are both federal and some state constitutional law protections. See, e.g., Heart of
Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 207 (Fla. 2007) (Lewis, C.J., concurring) (federal
due process and Florida's "independent Right to Privacy Clause" protect an "inchoate
interest in the opportunity to develop" a parent-child relationship for an unwed genetic
father whose child is placed for adoption).
44 A child at times has independent legal rights or interests in developing a parent-child
relationship with an unwed genetic father (especially where the mother is also unwed so
that there is no marital paternity presumption). See, e.g., FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS,
AND QUESTIONS 441 (Krause et al. eds., 6th ed. 2007). A child's statutory interest in a
relationship with a genetic parent is illustrated by a New Jersey law stating that a "parent
and child relationship" [under the Parentage Act] "extends equally to every child and to
every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-40
(West 2007). Somewhat different is a child's interest in knowing his or her origins. See,
e.g., Samantha Besson, Enforcing the Child's Right to Know Her Origins: Contrasting
Approaches Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the European Convention
on Human Rights, 21 INT'L J. L., POL'Y AND THE FAMILY 137, 138-39 (2007) (stating that a
child's right to know her origins "is now broadly recognized and respected" through
European countries' "constitutional and legislative guarantees" and "by international human
rights law" found in decisions by the European Court of Human Rights). Cf Sutton v.
Diane J., No. 273519, 2007 WL 840900, at *I (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 20, 2007) (minor could
not sue his mother in order to learn about his biological father, where the minor had earlier
been declared "an issue" of his mother's marriage in a dissolution proceeding but later
learned her ex-husband was not his biological father; court notes General Assembly had
authority to recognize such a claim). We do not here explore the differences we presume
would attend traditional paternity proceedings (where support, custody and visitation are
possible) and paternity proceedings where the only possible remedy under law would
involve information about the genetic ties between men and children. Yet we believe that
the emerging understandings about genetic ties and diseases make it probable there will be
increasing medical information during paternity inquiries.
45 Generally, the husbands of married mothers and the biological fathers of children
born to unmarried mothers (as a result of consensual sexual encounters) are responsible for
(continued)
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established, either prebirth or postbirth, "actual" parent-child relationships
or were subject to marital paternity presumptions.
A few contemporary legal principles outside of safe haven settings
demonstrate the limits on maternal (and paternal) decisionmaking about
children after birth. For example, the parent of a minor suffering tortious
injury cannot settle that minor's claim in or outside of a lawsuit without
judicial approval.46 Public policy protects "the best interests of the child
under the parens patriae doctrine. 4 7 Judicial approval is only available
where the settlement is fair and reasonable, with judges having broad
48
discretion to protect the rights of those who cannot protect themselves.
Additionally, in marriage dissolution proceedings, parents cannot
themselves determine child visitation, custody, or support. 49 Again,
judicial approval of agreements between parents is needed. 50 Approval is
usually secured only after consideration of a variety of factors, including
parental competency and fitness, parental willingness to accept all the
responsibilities of parenting, and the ability and willingness of each parent
to allow the other parent to provide child care while respecting the other
parent's rights and responsibilities, including the right to privacy.51
Finally, after birth, and without safe haven laws, legal mothers and fathers
child support, even when they are awarded no, or have never even attained, childrearing
rights or interests. See, e.g., Adrienne D. Gross, A Man's Right to Choose: Searchingfor
Remedies in the Face of Unplanned Fatherhood, 55 DRAKE L. REv. 1015, 1029 (2007)
(reporting that in paternity proceedings the man is assigned responsibility for child support
payments); Jessica L. Roberts, Conclusions from the Body: Coerced Fatherhood and
Caregivingas ChildSupport, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 501, 508 (2005) (commenting that
the traditional child support system requires unmarried fathers to pay child support); Amy
L. Wax, Traditionalism,Pluralism,and Same-Sex Marriage,59 RUTGERS L. REv. 377, 386
(2007) ("[Llaw and custom assign married men responsibility for their children's support
and well-being."); Melanie B. Jacobs, My Two Dads: DisaggregatingBiological and Social
Paternity, Aiz. ST. L. J. 809, 814 (2006) ("Often the biological father will also be the
social father, and all rights and responsibilities will rest with him.").
46 Baum v. Nigro, No. BER-L-010169-04, 2007 WL 1238360, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law. Div. Mar. 8, 2007) ("Under New Jersey Rule of Court 4:44, the parent or guardian of
a minor suffering tortious injury cannot settle the minor's claim without judicial or statutory
approval ....).
41Id. at

*9.
Id.(quoting N.J. CT. R. 4:44-3).
49See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/502(b) (West 2007).
5oId.
48

FML v. TW, 157 P.3d 455, 456 (Wyo. 2007) (citing WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201(a)
(2005)).
5'
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usually cannot simply walk away from parental responsibilities or agree
privately for exclusive responsibilities in one of two parents.52 These and
similar principles are undermined by safe haven laws. Lost fathers under
safe haven laws are especially troubling as these laws have been shown to
do very little to promote child protection.53
II. LOST PATERNITY UNDER OTHER LAWS
While difficult to acknowledge, mothers sometimes do not know what
is best for their children (even if we believe it is best to trust that potential
mothers know best as to whether their children should be born). Aside
from safe havens, there are other legal settings where mothers are solely
entrusted with the well-being of their children, to the exclusion of fathers,
but where mothers do not always know best.
In both adoption and birth record laws, unconditional maternal
decision-making about newborns (and children) is often permitted. In such
situations, too many unwed genetic fathers unfairly lose legal paternity or
their chances for legal paternity.
A. Adoption Laws
Adoptions of children born in the United States to unwed parents
typically prompt inquiries into legal maternity and paternity which, when
An
established, usually necessitate participation and veto rights. 54
underlying premise is that marriage should not be the sole route to parental
rights. 55 Another premise is that the postbirth parental rights of genetic

52

Dubay v. Wells, 442 F. Supp. 2d 404, 412 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (noting there are no

decisions recognizing a father's right to end his child support duties no matter how
emotionally removed he is from his child); State ex rel. Kayla T. v. Risinger, 731 N.W.2d
892, 895-96 (Neb. 2007) (noting that in Nebraska, as elsewhere, agreements between
parents depriving children of child support are void as against public policy).
53See, e.g., Sanger, supra note 20, at 758 (indicating that, at best, safe haven laws only
"possibly" prevent harm to newborns, or, if truly preventative, prevent "only a little" harm).
54 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.040 (2007) ("Persons required to consent") and 750
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/8 (West 2007) ("Consents to adoption and surrenders for
purposes of adoption").
55See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("[W]hatever the rights of the
individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried
and the married alike."); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (holding that failure
to afford a non-married parent a hearing on parental fitness while extending it to married
parents is contrary to the Equal Protection Clause).
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mothers and genetic fathers should be comparable.56 These premises
promote the aforenoted equality principles. Yet another premise is that it
is preferable for children to be raised by at least one genetic parent rather
than by genetic strangers. 57 Thus, when children are born to the unwed,
the genetic parents frequently are accorded in adoption proceedings
rights similar to the rights accorded married and divorced
participation
58
parents.
Unwed parents themselves are not always treated similarly. Genetic
mothers and genetic fathers typically have distinct avenues to securing
parental status, triggering participation rights in adoptions. As Professor
Katherine Bartlett has observed: "The fact that women by virtue of their
biological and current social positioning often have an edge with respect to
the parent-child relationship is unfortunate from the point of view of any
androgynous goals we might have.",59 Thus, in settings involving
consensual sexual intercourse, only mothers automatically acquire legal
parenthood, as only they bear children.6 ° Parental rights for unwed fathers

56

See, e.g., Rosero v. Blake, 581 S.E.2d 41, 50 (N.C. 2003) ("[W]e therefore hold that

the father's right to custody of his illegitimate child is legally equal to that of the child's
mother .. ");N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-40 (West 2007) ("The parent and child relationship
extends equally to... every parent, regardless of the marital status of the parents.").
57See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider, The ChannellingFunction in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 495, 501 (1992) (parents should preferably be the biological father and mother of
their children and support them during their minority).
58 Participation rights are not always the same. For example, unwed fathers, under Lehr
v. Robertson need to step up affirmatively to parenthood (e.g., initiate a lawsuit, register, or
otherwise voluntarily acknowledge paternity). Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262
(1983). Married fathers, on the other hand, usually automatically receive legal parent
status. via presumptions about genetic ties. See id. at 263. As to unwed fathers, there are
serious differences of opinion as to whether and to what extent this Lehr opportunity must
be afforded genetic fathers who step up as soon as they learn of their paternity, though
beyond the statutory limitation period. See, e.g., Marquette S. v. Bobby G., 734 N.W.2d 81,
84, 104 (Wis. 2007) (interpreting statute on parental rights terminations in contemplation of
adoption to allow step up, in part to avoid constitutional question).
59 Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L. J. 293, 339 (1988)
(footnote omitted).
60See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/4(1) (West 2007) ("the natural mother may
be established by proof of her having given birth to the child[.]"). By contrast, legal
parenthood is automatically presumed for many married men when their wives bear
children, see, e.g., id.at 45/5(a)(1); yet such paternity often is subject to rebuttable proof of
lack of genetic ties, at times even when the married men have parented well and wish to
(continued)
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often can only arise in adoption settings if there are both biological ties and
either actual parent-child relationships or other parental conduct (as
registering or acknowledging paternity). 6 1 These inequalities, sanctioned
by Nguyen, 62 are quite sensible.
Yet while certain distinctions between mothers and fathers are
warranted, the paternity interests of unwed fathers are, unfortunately too
often, not fully respected in American state adoption laws. Frequently,
unwed fathers have little or uncertain information about their offspring
around the time of birth.63 Even when aware, these fathers may have little
practical opportunity to develop parent-child relationships, or to secure, or
overcome obstacles to, legal paternity. 64
Mothers control both information and access. In the end, many
schemes for recognizing legal paternity during adoptions are unfair to
unwed genetic fathers. In too many instances, there are no serious
inquiries made regarding male genetic ties. 65 Further, the methods
continue to rear children. See, e.g., In re John M., 817 N.E.2d 500, 506 (Ill. 2004) (citing
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/5(b) (West 2002)).
61 See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262; Marquette S., 734 N.W.2d at 104.
62 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 63 (2001) (such inequalities are "neither surprising nor
troublesome from a constitutional perspective").
63 Even after relevant consensual sex, there is no duty on the part of an unwed pregnant
woman to notify the potential father of the pregnancy which she decides to carry to term.
See, e.g., In re TMK, 617 N.W.2d 925, 927 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000); see also Jeffrey A.
Parness, New Federal PaternityLaws: Securing More Fathers at Birth for the Children of
Unwed Mothers, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 59, 62 (2006) [hereinafter Parness, New Federal
PaternityLaws] (reporting that one in three children, totaling 500,000, who are born each
year in the United States as a result of consensual sex between unwed parents, have no
father designated on their birth certificates).
64 For example, an unwed mother has no legal duty to facilitate a positive father-child
relationship. And, unwed fathers can easily lose paternity opportunity interests by failing to
register in putative father registries or by failing to sue in paternity within a very short time
after birth. Their failures at times result from mothers moving to new states and the fathers
acting to establish paternity in the states where sex occurred. See, e.g., In re B.B.D., 984
P.2d 967 (Utah 1999); Bums v. Crenshaw, 733 P.2d 922 (Or. Ct. App. 1987); Hylland v.
Doe, 867 P.2d 551 (Or. Ct. App. 1994).
65 For example, in some states the only real inquiries involve searches of paternity
registers or other government records since failures to register (or to indicate a desire for
paternity)-regardless of reason-foreclose participation rights for unwed genetic fathers in
any later adoptions of their offspring. See, e.g., In re Baby Girl H., 635 N.W.2d 256 (Neb.
2001) (holding that genetic father need not consent to adoption as he failed to file a petition
to adjudicate paternity within a month of birth, as required by statute, though he did file a
(continued)
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available to unwed men in adoption cases for proving their genetic ties,
parent-child relationships, or other relevant parental conduct (such as
holding children out as their own in the community), prompting their rights
to notice and participation, often are both cumbersome and unfair.66
Practically speaking, much deference is paid to the choices of genetic
mothers even when these mothers abandon their children by placing them
for adoption. So, unwed mothers giving up their legal parenthood in
children often decide as a practical matter what-if any-chances for
parenthood should be afforded to the genetic fathers.
American state laws and cases also vary in their approach to unwed
genetic fathers who step up late in adoption proceedings, although acting
as soon as they know, or reasonably should know, of their genetic ties to
children placed for adoption.67 And state laws vary as to whether timely de
facto compliance with adoption procedures by genetic fathers, although
technically deficient, will preclude the fathers' parental participation. 68 As
a result, there are nationwide variations in the opportunities afforded to
unwed genetic fathers to participate in the proposed adoptions of their
offspring. Participation opportunities are often denied to unwed genetic
fathers when they fail to register, to provide child support, or to
acknowledge paternity. 69 A few cases and statutes serve to illustrate both
notice of intent to claim paternity and seek custody within five days of his knowledge of
birth, as required by statute; putative father who filed a timely petition, but in the wrong
court, loses as "ignorance of the law" was no excuse and he had been given an adequate
chance to protect his "opportunity interest" in fatherhood).
66 See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Participationof Unwed Biological Fathers in Newborn
Adoptions: Achieving Substantive and Procedural Fairness, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 223
(2003) [hereinafter Pamess, Participationof Unwed Biological Fathers](paper presented at
The Dave Thomas Center for Adoption Law at Capital University Law School).
67 See, e.g., Mary Beck, Toward a National Putative Father Registry Database, 25
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1031, 1060-62 (2002).
68 id.
69

Commentaries critical of contemporary adoption procedures because of their

unfairness to unwed genetic fathers include Robbin Pott Gonzalez, The Rights of Putative
Fathers to Their Infant Children in Contested Adoptions: Strengthening State Laws That
Currently Deny Adequate Protection, 13 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 39 (2006) and Oren, supra
note 20, at 154 (no U.S. Supreme Court guidance on how to protect the inchoate parental
opportunity interests of unmarried biological fathers). For a broader critique of adoption
procedures and their unfairness to all birth parents, see EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION
INSTITUTE,

SAFEGUARDING

THE RIGHTS AND WELL-BEING

(November 2006),
2007_01 _BirthparentStudy_All.pdf.
ADOPTION PROCESS

OF BIRTHPARENTS IN THE

http://www.adoptioninstitute.org/publications/
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the harshness of many of these laws and the interstate differences that
cause much confusion.7 °
1. Failureto Register as Putative Father
Addressing the failure to register as the putative father, an illustrative
case is the 2002 Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Heidbreder v.
Carton.71 There, a genetic father was told by an Iowa attorney that an
adoption of a child conceived to an unwed Iowa couple in Iowa needed the
father's consent.72 But, the mother, while pregnant, had moved to
Minnesota and did not tell the father. 73 A Minnesota adoption was
sustained over the father's objection because the father had not filed with
the Minnesota paternity registry within 30 days of birth, as was required by
Minnesota law. 74 The father lost even though he filed in Minnesota 31
days after the child's birth, on the very day he learned of the child's birth
in Minnesota.75 The father lost even though the mother had never
corrected her earlier statements to the father that she would not offer the
child for adoption.76 The court concluded there was no fraud because the
mother had no "fiduciary duty" to tell the father about the birth.77
2. Failureto ProvideSupport
For an illustration of the effects of a failure to support a child, there is
the 1989 Florida Supreme Court case, In re Adoption of Doe.78 The facts
70

Beck, supra note 67, at 1037 (2002).

71 Heidbreder v. Carton, 645 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. 2002).
72
1 d. at 361.
73Id.
74

Id. at 367.

71 Id. at 362.
76
ld. at 367.
77 Id. at 368 (no duty to genetic father "whom she knows is attempting to locate her,"

even where "she knows he wants to ... establish a relationship with his child"). At least in
some states the failure to register in a timely fashion will be excused if other steps toward
parenthood are taken. See, e.g., Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So. 2d 189, 205 (filing
of a petition to determine paternity on day child was born prompts standing for genetic
father in an adoption proceeding though no putative father registry action was taken by the
father).
78 In re Doe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1989) (Doe II). The Doe facts
were elaborately
reviewed, and its rulings were significantly critiqued, in Jeffrey A. Parness, Prospective
Fathers and Their Unborn Children, 13 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REV. 165, 166-71 (1991)
[hereinafter Pamess, Prospective Fathers]. Doe was preceded by an intermediate appeals
court opinion. In re Doe, 524 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (Doe I).
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of the case are set out in detail; they demonstrate why paternity law
reformers and case decision makers sometimes need to go beyond strict
and unforgiving guidelines in order to reflect more compassion for the
lives of those involved in legal paternity disputes.7 9 Deadlines barely
missed or requirements generally, though not technically, met should not
always be dispositive. Greater awareness of the impacts that court rulings
and statutes have on the lives of real people foster better law reform
dialogues.
The Doe case was tragic for all concerned; its tragedies could have
been avoided for the most part by better-written laws. The case began with
Richard and Mary, an unwed mother, who met during the summer of 1985
in Tempe, Arizona. 80 Soon thereafter, Mary was pregnant. 81 Early on
Richard urged Mary to get an abortion. 82 Mary resisted. 83 While Mary
saw herself as neither financially nor emotionally able to raise two children
alone, Richard thought he was not ready for marriage.84
The following months were turbulent. 85 Richard lived comfortably,
though he became unemployed and had to borrow money. 86 Mary lost her
job and asked Richard for rent money.87 Mary also began considering
adoption. 88 In March of 1986, Mary wrote to Richard's mother, saying
adoption was for her alone to decide. 89 Richard discussed the letter with
his mother and then wrote to Mary:
I respect any decision you make but let's put the axe away.
I hope you'll think about our whole situation. I really
would like to see my child. I've never had a child before
and it hurts me to think that he or she would grow up
thinking their father was a monster. No matter what you
take away from me, the child will still be a part of me. I'll
still love the child no matter if I ever see it. Every time
79 Doe II, 543 So. 2d at 742-43.
80

Id. at 742.

81id.
82
83

id.
id.

Id. at 742-43.
Id. at 743.
86 Id. at 750 n. 1 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
8

85

87

id.

88
9
'

Parness, ProspectiveFathers,supra note 78, at 166-67.
id. at 167.

WHERE ARE THE DADDIES?

2007]

you look at that child you'll see part of me there whether
you like it or not. That's a decision you and only you can
make. I do hope for the very best for you and my child. 90
By mid-April 1986, Mary was out of full-time work again. 91 Although
Richard was out of work until May, he provided meals for Mary and her
son, gave her furniture and clothes, bought her milk and baby food, and
paid insurance premiums for Mary's son.92
In July, Mary talked by phone with her mother in Florida. 93 She spoke
of adoption.94 With Mary's permission, her mother contacted a local
Tampa rabbi. 95 Before long, Bob and Jane Doe asked a Florida law office
to pursue possible adoption.96 On July 19, 1986, Mary called one of the
Does' attorneys.97 She told him the father of her child "wanted to have
nothing to do with her, the pregnancy or the baby" and had not provided
support. 98 She said she was financially destitute. 99 When the attorney
asked for the father's location, Mary said he would not cooperate.' 00 When
the attorney asked Mary where she wanted to have the baby, she said
Tampa.' 0 1 The attorney stressed the seriousness of adoption. 10 2 When
asked whether she still loved the father and would marry him, she
responded, "No."

103

Mary left Phoenix for Florida on August 3.104 The Does provided her
with one-way airfare and agreed to support her financially from August 1
until shortly after birth. 10 5 Mary and her son left Phoenix quietly, telling

90 Id.
91 Id
92

id.
93Id.
94 id.

95Id.
96Id.
97id.
98

Id.

99

1d.

100 Id.

101Id.
102
1d"
103

Id.

105
Id.
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Richard by a letter
channeled through her sister, who was told not to reveal
106
her whereabouts.
On August 8, Mary phoned Richard, said she was in Florida, and told
him why. 10 7 Afterwards, Mary and Richard frequently talked by phone.
Mary gave Richard only her Florida phone number and refused Richard's
offer to return to Arizona and to live with him outside of marriage.' 08
On August 12, Mary was interviewed by an officer of the Florida
Human Rehabilitative Services (HRS). 10 9 She was shown and she read a
form regarding consent to adoption. 110 She was told about its irrevocable
nature and cautioned not to sign if she had doubts. 11 Mary told the agency
officer that the father had never offered financial support, but
that he did
3
not deny paternity.' 1 2 The agency never contacted Richard. 11
By early September, Mary had brought to the office of the Does'
attorneys a letter written by Richard." 14 Dated August 18, it asked that
Mary "at least think about" letting him raise his child, who he hoped would
look like him. 1 5 Attorneys for the Does thereafter concluded that
Richard's consent to an adoption was unnecessary.7 1 6 They neither
contacted Richard nor informed the Does of the letter."
118
On September 4, Richard proposed marriage and Mary accepted.
Mary bought a wedding dress and told her mother.1 9 She told Richard she
120
would keep the child, though she did not tell the Does, HRS, or others.
Richard and Mary talked about reimbursing the Does. 121 Richard later

106

Id.

107 Id. at 167-68.
108 Id. at 168.
10

9 Id.
U0 Id.
111 d.

2id.
113id.
114

id.

115 Id.
116

1d.

1Id.
119Id.
120 Id.

121id.
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changed his mind. 122 Mary then asked
Richard to let her alone decide
23
no.
say
not
did
he
and
child,
the
about
During a later phone conversation, Richard urged Mary not to sign any
papers. 124 Mary then determined she would keep the baby. 25 When she
told her mother, however, her mother became angry and told Mary she
would have to fend for herself if there was no adoption. 26 Mary changed
12
her mind again. 1
After John was born to Mary on September 12, 1986, Mary
unsuccessfully tried to call Richard and her counselor, and asked the
hospital to contact a rabbi. 28 Early on Sunday morning, September 14,
Mary told a nurse she did not wish to see John anymore. 29 She took
medicine to dry her breast milk.130 Later that morning, two attorneys for
the Does and a nurse watched Mary sign adoption papers.13 ' Mary left the
hospital that day and John left the next day with the Does. 132 Richard did
not learn what happened until later, when he was called by an ex-girlfriend
whom Mary had asked to give him the news. 133 He then called Mary, and
proposed that they get John back and get married. 34 Richard also called
his mom
saying: "Mother, can you believe I have a son? I'm going to get
35
,,1

it.

On September 17, Richard called one of the Does' attorneys and
vowed to stop the adoption. 136 Soon after, Richard flew to Florida with
baby clothes in hand. 37 On September 18, Mary cancelled her
appointment with one of the Does' attorneys. 38 On September 19, Richard
122

Id.

123

id.

124

id.

125Id.
126 id.
127 id.
128
129

Id
Id

130Id.
131 Id. at
132/Id. at

133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
138

id
id.

168-69.
169.
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filed an acknowledgement of paternity in Florida and signed John's birth
certificate.139 Finally, on September 22, the Does were told by one of their
from Richard and Mary's attorney)
attorneys (who had received a 1call
40
about Richard and Mary's plans.
Bob and Jane Doe declined to relinquish John. 14 1 On October 22, they
filed an adoption petition.142 Richard and Mary were married on
43

November 15, in Arizona.1
A three-day adoption hearing was held in May, 1987.144 A month later
the adoption was granted with the court determining that Mary's written
consented to adoption by
consent was valid and that Richard had impliedly
1 45
Mary.
to
support
meaningful
failing to provide
Richard and Mary appealed. 146 The intermediate appeals court
concurred that Mary's consent was freely given. 14' However, because it
found abandonment covered only children born alive, it held that Richard's
and that the adoption was void for want of
prebirth conduct was irrelevant
48
Richard's written consent.1
In April, 1989, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed as to Mary 149 and
ruled that Richard's pre-birth conduct was relevant to the issue of whether
Richard "evinced a settled purpose to assume parental duties.'1 50 The high
court found that Richard's efforts were "marginal" and insufficient to show
"a settled purpose to assume parental duties."' 5' It thus determined
Richard's consent was unnecessary, 152 even though Richard seemed
139

id.

140 id.
141

id.

142 Id.
143 Id.
144id

In re Doe, 524 So. 2d 1037, 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (Doe /) (the statute only
expressly addressed written consent after birth).
146Id. at 1038.
147 Id. at 1041.
148 Id. at 1044.
149 In re Doe, 543 So. 2d 741, 744 (Fla. 1989) (Doe I).
150 Id. at 746.
151 Id. at 747.
152 Id. A far stronger case of prebirth paternal abandonment in Florida is In re Adoption
145

of Baby E.A.W., 658 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 1995) (also ruling that the lack of emotional support
and emotional abuse may be considered). Outside of Florida, statues do not always permit
consideration of prebirth acts, like abandonment, on right to notice in adoption cases. See,
(continued)
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hampered
in his attempt to assume parenthood by the unilateral acts of
53
Mary.

1

In finding prebirth abandonment, the Florida Supreme Court failed to
sufficiently describe the prebirth child support acts necessary to prompt a
right to notice, failed to urge the legislature to do so, and failed to explain
in much detail how Richard's conduct was deficient. Little has changed in
Florida (and elsewhere), so that paternity opportunity losses due to failures
There
of prebirth support remain subject to excessive judicial discretion.
15 4
variations.
interstate
also
but
uncertainties,
are not only intrastate
3. Failureto Acknowledge
On the failure to acknowledge paternity, there are the self-described
"strict" requirements in Utah on the participation rights of unwed fathers in
newborn adoptions. 55 To protect their rights, men in Utah must secure a
paternity adjudication or file a voluntary declaration of paternity before
maternal relinquishment. 156 Where maternal relinquishment is permitted
twenty four hours after birth, there would often be very little time for men
to sue or file. 157 In the alternative, a man must manifest "a full
commitment to his parental responsibilities" by commencing paternity
proceedings and taking on financial responsibilities for pregnancy
e.g., Helen G. v. Mark J.H., 145 P.3d 98, 107-09 (N.M. Ct. App. 2006), cert. granted, 146
P.3d 810 (N.M. 2006) (examining N.M. STAT. §§ 32A-5-15(B) and 32A-5-15(C)).
153 See, e.g., Mary's providing false information to the Does' attorneys, supra notes 98,
100, 103; Mary's leaving Arizona for Florida without telling Richard her destination, supra
note 106; Mary's keeping her exact location in Florida secret from Richard, supra note 108;
Mary's telling the agency officer that Richard had never offered financial support, supra
note 112; Mary's telling Richard she would keep the child while failing to tell the same to
the Does, HRS, or others, supra note 120.
154 See Parness, Prospective Fathers, supra note 78 (suggesting more precise
articulation and better coordination of state social policies on prebirth paternal duties,
though they would differ from the policies on the duties of pregnant women). A very
different approach to a comparably situated unwed genetic father was taken, for example, in
In re Matthew D., 818 N.Y.S. 2d 399 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (father acted sufficiently
though he did not pay any pregnancy expenses; as in Doe, father believed there would be no
surrender for adoption and mother frustrated efforts to establish father-child relationship).
155 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.14-4.15 (2002).
156UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.14(1)(d) (2002).
157 Thumwald v. A.E., 163 P.3d 623 (Utah 2007) (under statutes in effect in 2004, a
mother had to wait one day; court held (given Lehr) that if maternal relinquishment
occurred one day later, on a holiday or weekend when government offices were closed, an
unwed father had until the end of the first business day after such relinquishment to act).
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expenses. 15 8 Utah legislators did declare that unwed fathers deceived by
mothers can "pursue civil or criminal penalties in accordance with
[unstated] existing law," but also concluded that fraud is "no defense" to
"strict compliance" and may not serve to undo an adoption.' 59 Utah
lawmakers reasoned that "an unmarried biological father is in the best
position to prevent or ameliorate the effects of fraud.' 160 By contrast, in a
South Carolina case where a genetic father's consent to adoption was
needed, his "strict" compliance with prebirth support duty was excused
when it was caused by "the whim" of the mother, especially61 because the
father acted sufficiently and promptly upon learning of birth.'
B. Birth RecordLaws
American state birth record laws also effectively permit unconditional
maternal decision-making about paternity.
Before the 1996 federal
mandates on voluntary paternity acknowledgments, 162 state birth certificate
laws for children born in the United States to unwed mothers typically
permitted the certificates themselves to establish legal paternity. 63 In
Illinois, from 1993-1996, these certificates could include a purported
genetic father's name with his consent, if accompanied by the written
consent of the mother. 164 Before 1993, however, maternal consent to
paternity recognition was not expressly required. 165 Additionally, and
more importantly, hospital personnel in Illinois birth facilities, as of 1993,
were required to attempt to secure paternity as well as maternity
designations. 166 A statute declared that the "person responsible for
preparing and filing the birth certificate ...shall make a reasonable effort
to obtain the signatures of both parents." 67 Since 1996, with the advent of
158

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b) (2002).

159 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.15(2) (2002).

160 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-4.15(3) (2002).
161 Doe v. Queen, 552 S.E.2d 761 (S.C. 2001).
16242 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)-(E) (2000).
163 See e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12 (1993) (amended 2007), found in Illinois
Public Act 88-159 (eff. July 28, 1993).
164 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(4) (1996) (amended 2007), found in Illinois Public Act
89-6941 (eff. Aug. 9, 1996).
165 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(4) (1993) (amended 2007), found in Illinois Public Act
88-159 (eff. July 28, 1993).
166 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(2) (1993) (amended 2007), found in Illinois
Public Act
88-159 (eff. July 28, 1993)
167 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(4).
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new federal Social Security Act mandates, alleged genetic fathers can be
included on birth certificates of children born to unwed mothers only if
they and the mothers sign witnessed acknowledgments of parentage.168
Such acknowledgments, practically speaking, are generally only available
in hospitals at the time of birth or in government offices sometime
thereafter. Acknowledgments
by a mother and a purported father usually
69
are pursued simultaneously. 1
"Jodie Foster mothering," wherein unwed mothers choose to parent
their children alone, is thus facilitated by the new federal voluntary
paternity acknowledgment laws. Without maternal consent, no man's
name may be entered as a father on a birth certificate. 70 There are no
duties imposed on hospital personnel or on government officers at birth or
shortly thereafter to locate unnamed male genetic parents of children born
to unwed mothers.17 1 In fact, there has never been serious federal
governmental interest in exploring, after birth, the legal paternity of all
children born fatherless. Governments often only become interested in
fatherless birth certificates where the mothers wish to receive
governmental assistance on behalf of their children and where welfare
officials wish reimbursements for past child support or the avoidance of
future child support. 72 To qualify for financial aid, mothers usually must
cooperate in "good faith" in helping to establish legal paternity. 7 3
168
169

410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/12(5)(a) (2007).
For a comparative review of American state voluntary paternity acknowledgment

procedures, see Parness, New FederalPaternityLaws, supra note 63, at 70-93 (reviewing
differing state laws on both executing and rescinding voluntary paternity
acknowledgments). For a comprehensive review of Illinois paternity acknowledgment and
other legal paternity establishment procedures, see Jeffrey A. Parness, No Genetic Ties, No
More Fathers: Voluntary Acknowledgment Rescissions and Other Paternity
Disestablishments Under Illinois Law, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1295 (2006) [hereinafter
Parness, No Genetic Ties].
170See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(C)-(E) (2000).
171 See id.
172 See, e.g., David D. Meyer, Parenthoodin a Time of Transition: Tensions
Between
Legal Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood,54 AM. J. COMP. LAW 125, 14041 (2006), where Professor Meyer observes:
The child-support duties of non-custodial parents are now dictated
by formulaic guidelines that take only limited account of individual
circumstances. Enforcement of those obligations, long weak and
ineffective, has grown increasingly stringent. Largely as a result of
federal efforts to recoup welfare spending, a great deal of this
(continued)
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And so, while men who engaged in unprotected heterosexual acts
usually may register under state paternity registration schemes in order to
safeguard certain paternity rights (as in adoptions), their partners have no
obligation to inform them of pregnancies or births. American governments
then do little to find the fathers omitted from birth records. Additionally,
should women lie about genetic ties, there is little recourse for the many
genetic fathers interested in parenting who come forward late,
even if they
174
acted as soon as they learned of the births of their offspring.
C. Consequences of Lost PaternityArising From Adoption and Birth
Record Laws
While unfettered maternal decisionmaking underlies birth certificate,
adoption notice, and safe haven laws, its dangers to actual and would-be
legal fathers are far more pronounced in the first two settings. There are
relatively few maternal uses of safe haven laws. 75 As to birth certificates,
however, there are, increasing numbers of children born in the United
States to unwed mothers where there are no marital presumptions that
automatically designate men as legal fathers. 176 And, there are growing
numbers of out-of-wedlock children with no fathers named on their birth
certificates. 77 A half-century ago, about one in every twenty children was

enforcement activity is focused on the working or non-working poor,
with much of the money collected going directly to reimburse the
government rather than to support dependent children. Moreover, the
trend is to sever the legal obligation of support from the prerogatives of
contact with supported children.
'73 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 654(29)(A) (2000) (Title IV-D benefits); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 53-6-113(6) (2007) (Title IV-D cooperation duties can be extended to Medicaid
applicants); and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:17-56.55 (West 2007) (applicants for Medicaid,
public assistance and Title IV-D aid must cooperate "in good faith in establishing
paternity").
174 See, e.g., In re Baby Doe, 734 N.E.2d 281, 285-87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (reviewing
adoption cases wherein genetic fathers acted as soon as they learned of birth, though none
registered with a paternity father registry and some did not even know of the pregnancy); In
re Baby Boy K., 546 N.W.2d 86, 88-91, 101 (S.D. 1996) (same).
175 See, e.g., Sanger, supra note 20, at 763, n.43 (105 cases in 1998), 789, nn. 223-224
(often in a state the numbers of illegal abandonments are more than the numbers of legal
abandonments).
176 See Parness, New FederalPaternityLaws, supra note
63, at 62.
177 Id.
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born out-of-wedlock in the United States. 17 8 Today, it is about one in
three. 179 There are approximately one and a half million births of out-ofwedlock children each year in the United States. 180 While statistics are
scarce, seemingly about one in three of these children, or about a half
million children a year, are born without a legally designated father.' 8'
With adoptions as well, there are large numbers of lost daddies.
Newborns placed for adoption by unwed mothers often have no designated
father under law. 82 In such situations, during a parental rights recognition
or termination hearing that precedes an adoption, if the birth certificate for
the child to be adopted names no father, little is done to identify, locate and
notify the genetic father unnoted on the birth records. 83 Little is done to
find the genetic father even when there are no allegations, or even hints of,
abandonment, unfitness, domestic abuse or ambivalence. 184 At times, as
with Richard in the Doe case, findings of abandonment (or neglect or the
like) might even be strongly prompted by concerns over removing a child
from a home where the child has lived, loved, and been loved for some
extended time, even though much time ran because of litigation delays.
Recall that in the Doe case there was a September 1986 birth; a June 1987
initial adoption order; and, a final Supreme Court ruling in April 1989.185
Delays are now being addressed here and there, though judicial frustration
186
is often evident.
Failures to inquire into genetic fatherhood, however, do result at times
in undoing adoptions when genetic fathers successfully show no personal
fault and an adequate interest in parenthood, leading to children being tom
by government from the only parents they have known in order to be
handed over to strangers. 87 Interstate differences are exemplified by the
178

Id.

179 Id.
180

id.

181Id
182

Pamess, Participationof Unwed BiologicalFathers,supra note 66, at 224.

183 Reforms are suggested in id. at 232-36.
184 Id

at 224.
185In re Doe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1989).
186 See, e.g., DNW v. Dept. of Fam. Services, 154 P.3d 990, 995 (Wyo. 2007) (J. Hill,
dissenting) ("Exactly why this [paternity disestablishment] case took three years and four
months to be resolved is not readily evident from the record.").
187 See, e.g., Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182 (Ill. 1994) ("Baby Richard" case,
where an adoption undone when child was over three) and its follow-up, Petition of
Kirchner, 649 N.E.2d 324, 327-28, 332, 339-40 (Ill. 1995) (habeas corpus action by unwed
(continued)
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aforenoted Utah and South Carolina approaches to compliance with
paternity identification requirements.
III. MATERNAL PRIVACY INTERESTS Do NOT ALWAYS JUSTIFY LOST
PATERNITY

Maternal privacy interests certainly are implicated in laws promoting
greater and more accurate designations of legal fathers at birth for children
born to unwed mothers.' 88 These interests are frequently urged to counter
possible law reforms benefiting lost daddies. 189 These maternal interests
''
primarily involve either "decisional privacy" or "information privacy. 90
Decisional privacy "is usually defined as the right of individuals to make
genetic father to secure custody of Baby Richard pursuant to the earlier court order),
overruledby In re R.L.S., 844 N.E.2d 22 (I11.2006).
188While we recognize that some perceive a recent shift in the precedents from a focus
on unenumerated substantive due process privacy rights to a focus on privacy interests as
constituent values of the enumerated due process right to liberty, we do not see this shift as
limiting in any ways our suggested reforms.
189See, e.g., the rather extreme position in E. Gary Spitko, The ConstitutionalFunction
of Biological Paternity: Evidence of the Biological Mother's Consent to the Biological
Father's Co-Parentingof Her Child, 48 ARIZ. L. REv. 97, 111 (2006) (the birth mother's
"constitutional right to direct the moral upbringing of her child should include.., the
power to prevent another from becoming a parent to her child"). See also Cecily L. Helms
and Phyllis C. Spence, Take Notice Unwed Fathers:An Unwed Mother's Right to Privacy
in Adoption Proceedings,20 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 39-40 (2005) ("A father's rights are
not, and should not be, dependent on a birth mother's disclosures[;]" as a mother has a right
to privacy, less intrusive means are available in adoption cases to meet putative fathers'
rights, like putative father registries).
Maternal privacy interests also are urged by those concerned with certain childcare
decisions made by women who are often uninformed. For example, some see these
interests in informed decisionmaking undermined in current laws on maternal consents to
adoption. See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Samuels, Time to Decide? The Laws Governing Mothers'
Consents to the Adoption of Their Newborn Infants, 72 TENN. L. REv. 509, 511 (2005)
(states do not adequately promote mothers' deliberate decision making). The 1989 Florida
high court decision in In re Doe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1989) provides a good fact pattern on
which to chew (there, the mother's plea of coercion was denied).
190Such privacy interests are often judicially recognized. See, e.g., C.N. v. Ridgewood
Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2005)(constitutional right to privacy protects
"interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and.. . in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions"). Another category of privacy interests, at times
called locational or situational, or described as ties to physical space, have been recognized,
but such interests seem largely irrelevant to legal paternity designations, so they are not
further analyzed. As well, we do not consider any privacy interests arising in contract.
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certain kinds of fundamental choices with respect to their personal and
reproductive autonomy, and has its locus in the constitutional
jurisprudence of Roe v. Wade and Griswold v. Connecticut."' 91
Information privacy is "usually defined as the right of individuals to
control information about themselves," drawing "primarily upon the tort
law of privacy, state and federal legislation, and constitutional protections
guaranteed by the First and Fourth Amendments."' 92 Neither decisional
privacy nor information privacy 93 foreclose, however, our suggested law
reforms that would limit maternal conduct and expand governmental
responsibilities regarding legal paternity.19 4
A. DecisionalPrivacy
While the notion of a person's right to decisional privacy perhaps first
gained a foothold with the publication of "The Right to Privacy" in the

191Neil M. Richards, The Information Privacy Law Project Reviewing the Digital
Person: Privacy and Technology in the Information Age, 94 GEO. L.J. 1087, 1089 (2006)
(book review). Perhaps the broadest statement by the U.S. Supreme Court on decisional
privacy appears in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 851 (1992), an abortion case wherein the Court said: "At the heart of liberty is the right
to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were
they formed under compulsion of the State." Criticisms of the passage (including failed
arguments) are reviewed in Teresa Stanton Collett, The Creation and Taking of Human
Life: The Court's Confused (and Confusing) Understandingof the Creation and Taking of
Human Life, 68 MONT. L. REv. 265 (2007).
192 Richards, supranote 191, at 1089.
193 While we employ Professor Richards' general descriptions of decisional and
informational privacy, we recognize that not all cases nearly fit his scheme. See id. For
example, neither the Roe nor Griswold rulings on decisional privacy is significantly
understood as a First Amendment case (which to Richards prompts informational privacy).
Id. But see Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("If the First Amendment means
anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house,
what books he may read or what films he may watch."), which seemingly involves one's
personal autonomy rather than control of information about oneself.
194 We admit to some uncertainty on the nature of governmental interests sufficient to
limit decisional or information privacy. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong
About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 227, 235 (2006). Yet whatever the
standard (strict scrutiny, undue burden, rational basis), we believe maternal privacy interests
provide no significant barriers to our suggested paternity law reforms.
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HarvardLaw Review in 1890,195 it took quite some time for the notion to
gain serious attention from American lawmakers. Decisional privacy is a
relatively new legal concept in the United States. Attention grew after the
1 96
1965 United States Supreme Court decision in Griswold v. Connecticut,
which held that a married couple had a right to privacy with respect to
"what to do in the privacy of their marital bedrooms, without the intruding
nose of the state of Connecticut."1 97 Governmental intrusion there
involved decisions regarding contraceptive use.
In Griswold, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a Connecticut statute
prohibiting the use of "any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the
purpose of preventing conception"' 198 The statute was challenged by the
Executive Director and the Medical Director of the Planned Parenthood
League of Connecticut after they were charged and fined under a related
statute that allowed criminal sanctions against anyone who assists another
to commit a crime.' 99 Once recognizing that the challengers had standing
to raise the constitutional rights of married people,2 °0 the Court noted that
marriage was a "relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees., 20 1 The Court then said that
"a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms., 202 The Court concluded American governments could not
generally deny married couples decisional authority on contraceptive use.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in 1972 that a
Massachusetts statute allowing the distribution of contraceptives to married
persons, but not single persons, violated equal protection principles.20 3 The
Court defined the right to privacy to include "the right of an individual...
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so

195

Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARV. L. REv. 193,

195-96 (1890) (reviewing cases involving, inter alia, defamation, breach of confidence and
invasion of property and designating them as "right to privacy" cases).
196 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
197 Ken Gromley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1335, 1392.
198 Griswold,381 U.S. at 480-85.
'99 Id. at 480.
200

Id. at 481.

2' Id.at 485.
202

id.

203

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972).
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fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
,2 4
child. 0
Roe v. Wade20 5 followed in 1973. There the U.S. Supreme Court found
that for a pregnant woman, married or single, the "right of personal privacy
includes the abortion decision but that this right is not unqualified and must
be considered against important state interest in regulation., 20 6 Thus, the
Court allowed American governments to promote in some ways their
interests in "safeguarding health, maintaining medical standards and
protecting potential life."2 °7 As to a "compelling" state interest that could
limit the right, the Court said American states could normally deny
abortion access where there was viable human life.20 8 By contrast, the
Court found abortion decisions early in pregnancy generally could not be
made by the state, but rather were for women, upon consultation with their
physicians and other health professionals. 20 9 The Court concluded that a
"state criminal abortion statute of the current Texas type, that excepts from
criminality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without
regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests
involved" violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.21 0
While the Roe Court did not allow absolute state power over abortion
decisions, it also did not allow a pregnant woman unfettered decisionmaking regarding childbirth. A woman's right to choose early in
pregnancy remains relatively strong thirty-five years after Roe. 211 The
government's interest in potential viable human life remains a potential
barrier to female decision making, especially where there is no health
danger. The rationale in Roe suggests that what happens to a child once
born cannot be subject to exclusive maternal control. While potential
fathers cannot participate much in decisions on prenatal care, nor on
pregnancy termination, a father can fully participate in childrearing once a
child is born. In fact, under prevailing public policies, a father typically
merits an equal opportunity to rear children, such that unilateral decision
204

Id. at 453.

205 Roe
2 6

v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

1d. at

154.

207 Id.
20 8

Id. at 163-64.

2091d. at

164.

210Oid
211 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846
(1992); Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1626-27 (2007).
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making by a mother cannot be tolerated. A law strongly encouraging, if
not usually requiring, a new mother, in good-faith, to identify or help to
identify the potential father does not significantly undercut her decisional
privacy on whether to bear a child. Perhaps a similar law can even operate
postviability 21 2 but prebirth, where abortion decision making rights are
quite limited and future births are likely. A woman's right to make
important decisions about pregnancy should not encompass absolute
control over childcare decisions after (or about) birth.213 Of course,
childcare decisions by custodial mothers are less susceptible to government
regulation when, for example, the religious views 214 or the health interests
of the mothers 2 5 are in play. And childcare decisions by custodial mothers
recognized by courts as having the final say are less susceptible to
government interference though there are noncustodial fathers with some
constitutionally-protected childrearing rights.21 6
The decisional privacy interests accorded to married and unmarried
people regarding contraception, and to pregnant women regarding
abortion, significantly differ from maternal decisions about paternity of
children born alive. Decisions on whether to have a baby differ from
decisions on how to raise a baby once it is born. Legal paternity
designations typically are made postbirth; they thus come only after, and
212

In fact, many pregnant women with pre-viable fetuses who learn about their post-

viability paternity identification duties will make more informed decisions about abortion.
213 Cf Kimberly Yuracko, Illiberal Education: Constitutional Constraints on
Homeschooling, 95 CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=-980100 (states can not only regulate homeschooling, but also must regulate in
order "to ensure that homeschooled children received a basic minimum education and are
not severely disadvantaged in their educational opportunities because of sex").
214 McGrath v. Mountain, 784 So. 2d 607, 607-08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (mothers
immunization wishes on religious/medical ground upheld over father's). See also In re
Shmuel G., 2005 WL 2183648 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Feb. 7, 2005); Diana H. v. Rubin, 171 P.3d
200 (Ariz. Ct. App., 2007). In both instances children were in state custody, but the
mothers' religious convictions regarding immunization were followed. In re Shmuel G.,
2005 WL 2183648, at *2, *4; DianaH., 171 P.3d at 201-02, 207-08.
215 For example, mothers (or fathers) can object to child custody/visitation orders
benefiting fathers (or mothers) where the objectors' health interests are placed at risk, as
where children would be placed in environments that would necessarily expose the
objectors to health risks such as exposure to second-hand smoke or other materials which
could be dangerous to them. See Badeaux v. Badeaux, 541 So. 2d 301, 303 (La. Ct. App.
1989). The custody agreement was altered for various reasons-one being the existence of
second-hand smoke in the father's home. Id. at 302-03.
216 Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2004).
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only pertain when, a woman has decided to bear a child.21 7 It is well
recognized that once a woman gives birth her childrearing authority (and
that of any other legal parent) is far isfrom absolute. 218 Limits can be
grounded on governmental interests 219 as well as on paternity interests 22° or
children's interests. 221 Thus, mothers need not be accorded absolute
decision-making powers over such matters as placing children for adoption
or abandoning children at shelters. Unfortunately, absolute maternal
authority is sometimes wrongly accorded even though there are strong
countervailing state and individual interests.
B. Information Privacy
While decisional privacy seemingly blossomed in the mid-twentieth
century,222 information privacy seemingly developed earlier. Warren and
217

On occasion paternity designations can occur prebirth, but typically only attain legal

significance upon live birth. Compare HAW. REV. STAT. § 584-3.5 (2006) (voluntary
paternity acknowledgment may be filed prior to birth) with UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45g304(a) (2007) (after birth).
218 While all agree that the childrearing authority of legal parents is limited,
there are
spirited debates about the nature of such limits in certain settings, though not usually in
settings involving decisions to raise children alone where there are existing legal parentage
rights and interests of others. One area of debate involves grandparent visitation orders
over the objection of one parent where the other parent (usually the child of the interested
grandparent) has died. Compare Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510, 514 (Fla. 1998)
(rejecting a grandparent's request for visitation rights to favor the parent's right of privacy)
with Hiller v. Fausey, 904 A.2d 875, 901-02 (Pa. 2006) (more accommodating to a
grandparent).
219 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 38-39 (1905)
(compulsory
vaccination laws protect local communities against the spread of smallpox).
220 In part, paternity interests (as well as children's best interests) are usually promoted
by legal presumptions about genetic ties (as with husbands whose wives bear children) that
trigger childrearing rights (as well as child support duties), so that maternal consent is
unnecessary.
221 Consider, for example, laws allowing adoptees, who have reached the
age of
majority, to have access to their own adoption records without a showing of good cause and
without the consent of the biological parents. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 109.502 (2005)
and TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-127 (2005). Consider, as well, Janet Leach Richards and
Sheryl Wolf, Medical Confidentiality and Disclosureof Paternity,48 S.D. L. REV. 409, 442
(2003) (concluding that when issues involving incorrect paternity designations arise for
physicians, the "child's medical records should note the paternity conflict and be made
available to the child upon attaining maturity").
222 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
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Brandeis in their Harvard piece noted a right "to be let alone," identified by
Judge Cooley,223 and concluded it merited some protection, especially
225
224
given emerging technology, though there should be some limitations.
Information privacy rights and interests of mothers who seek to control
information about themselves are recognized in constitutional law, tort
law, and elsewhere.226 They encompass both wishes by mothers not to be
compelled to reveal information about their children, and wishes by
mothers not to have others compelled to reveal, or even approached for,
information about their children. As unwanted information gathering
(outside maternal controls) can be undertaken publicly or privately, there
can be both constitutional (e.g., privacy) and nonconstitutional (e.g., tort)
barriers to accessing information about childbirth that are founded on
227
maternal privacy.
One case with language on mothers who wished not be to compelled
by government to reveal "information" about their children is Lehr v.
Robertson.22 8 There, the United States Supreme Court found in 1983 that
the biological father of a child born out of wedlock did not have an
"absolute right to notice and the opportunity to be heard" before his child
could be adopted. 229 Though the biological father knew of the child, he did
not early on develop a parent-child relationship, provide child support, or
register with the state putative father registry. 230 The biological father, in
223Warren

& Brandeis, supra note 195, at 195 (citing THoMAs M. COOLEY, A TREATISE

(2d
ed. 1888)).
224 For example, Kodak had recently introduced the instant camera at a price allowing
many access to picturing their neighbors instantly; and, newspapers were entering more
fully into the gossip business. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 195, at 195. For the view
that information privacy "has received very little attention from the Supreme Court" but
merits "much more protection," see Erwin Chemerinsky, RediscoveringBrandeis 's Right to
ON THE LAW OF TORTS OR THE WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENT OF CONTRACT 29

Privacy, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 643, 644 (2007).
225
226

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 195, at 214-19.
For a comparison of American and English experiences with information privacy,

see Neil M. Richards and Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality,96 GEO. L.J. 123, 124-25 (2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=969495.
227 For a mother's privacy, there can be limits on information giving by others as well as
on information gathering by others. Consider, e.g., D. Utah Loc. R. 7-3 ("Constraints on
Disclosing Personal Data in Civil Filings;" suggested limits cover "medical records").
228 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
229 Id. at 250.
230
Id. at 251-52.
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fact, did not assert paternity rights until the child was over two, at a time
when an adoption proceeding initiated by the mother and her husband was
pending. 231 The biological father alleged that the biological mother
concealed her whereabouts after birth and obstructed his attempts at child
contact and child support.232 In the pertinent language, Justice White
stated in dissent:
Absent special circumstances, there is no bar to requiring
the mother of an illegitimate child to divulge the name of
the father when the proceedings at issue involve the
permanent termination of the father's rights. Likewise,
there is no reason not to require such identification when it
is the spouse of the custodial parent who seeks to adopt the
child. Indeed, the State now requires the mother to
provide the identity of the father if she applies for financial
benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children Program .... The state's obligation to provide
notice to persons before their interests are permanently
terminated cannot be a lesser concern than its obligation to
assure that state funds are not expended when there exists
a person
upon whom the financial responsibility should
33
fall.

2

We believe there remains no bar and that Justice White's sentiments
are today reflected in state public policies, including equal treatment for
mothers and fathers and a desire that there be two parents for every child
conceived by consensual sex.
A federal constitutional privacy right relating to maternal control of
personal information on childbirth obtained by government from others
can be grounded in the 1977 United States Supreme Court decision Whalen
v. Roe.234 There the Court examined the constitutionality of New York
statutes requiring information be provided to the state by physicians and
others about individuals who were prescribed controlled substances.235
Specifically, physicians lawfully prescribing schedule II controlled
substances were required to provide the names and addresses of the
prescription recipients to New York for collection in a Department of
231 Id. at 252.
232 Id. at 269
233

(White, J., dissenting).

Id. at 273 n.5.

234
235

Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
Id. at 593.
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Health database. The governmental purpose was to help the state identify
individuals who were improperly accessing regulated substances. 6
Access to the database was significantly restricted and paper prescription
forms were securely kept.237 In Whalen, the prescription recipients argued
the statute invaded "a constitutionally protected 'zone of privacy."' 238 The
high Court identified two interests often associated with privacy, an
"individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters" and
"independence in making certain kinds of important decisions., 23 9 The
disclosure of names was said by the Court to implicate the first interest. In
Whalen, the Court determined that the New York scheme did not
unlawfully infringe upon any privacy interests.2 40 The Court noted the
legitimate governmental interests included the minimizing of "the misuse
of dangerous drugs.",24 1 The Court also found the protections against
erroneous disclosures were adequate, demonstrating a "proper concern
with, and protection of, the individual's interest in privacy. 242 Because
there were adequate security measures, the Court did not discuss any
scenario with a significant chance of unwarranted information
disclosure.24 3 As with drugs, the identification of a potential father by
physicians and other health care professionals serving a mother could
involve a recordkeeping system carefully crafted to protect against
improper disclosures while simultaneously promoting important state
goals. 24
236

Id. at 591-92.

237Id. at
23

593 (paper prescription forms were also to be destroyed after five years).

1Id. at 598.

239

Id. at 599-600.

240 Id at 600.
241 Id. at

597-98 (noting there was "nothing unreasonable in the assumption that the

patient-identification requirement might aid in the enforcement of laws designed to
minimize the misuse of dangerous drugs," in that it would deter potential violators and "aid
in the detection or investigation" of drug abuse).
242 Id. at 605.
243 Id. at 605-06.
244 Compare, e.g., Bradley v. Children's Bureau of South Carolina, 274 S.E.2d 418
(S.C. 1981) (upon showing of "good cause," adopted child can secure identity of natural
parents though they had a general, constitutionally-protected expectation of privacy arising
from adoption statutes) with Doe v. Ward Law Firm, P.A., 579 S.E.2d 303 (S.C. 2003)
("good cause" shown for release of adoption file as adopted child had both physical and
mental health issues). For an excellent review of medical information privacy and
compulsory disclosure laws after Whalen v. Roe, see Wendy K. Mariner, Mission Creep:
Public Health Surveillance and MedicalPrivacy, 87 B.U. L. REv. 347 (2007).
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When information on paternity is sought by private actors where the
mothers object on privacy grounds, the constitutional restraints imposed by
Whalen and comparable federal constitutional precedents limiting
governmental actions may still come into play. They are relevant when
private actors so significantly employ governmental mechanisms in
seeking the information, such as depositions in civil cases or freedom of
information requests, that the so-called constitutional "state action"
requirement is met. 2 45 They are not relevant, however, where private
information gathering about paternity does not significantly employ
governmental mechanisms, such as on-the-street conversations with the
mothers or with her friends or family members.
A paternity or marriage dissolution case illustrates the boundaries on
nongovernmental actors securing information from mothers about paternity
when governmental mechanisms are employed. In such cases, mothers
usually can be compelled to reveal information relevant to paternity
designations.2 46 For example, in a paternity case involving an unwed
mother and an alleged genetic father, questions about the mother's sexual
acts will be forbidden when they are not relevant, as when the alleged
father is estopped from denying genetic ties 24 7 or when the questions

245
246

See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000).
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7551 (West 2004) (paternity tests may be ordered for a

mother, child and alleged genetic father in a suit involving paternity of the child). Compare
People v. Hernandez, 2007 WL 2123760 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (applying state statute
requiring a criminal defendant involved in certain sexual offenses to submit to HIV testing
if there is "probable cause to believe" a bodily fluid capable of transmitting HIV was
transferred to the victim) with John B. v. Superior Court, 137 P.3d 153, 167-68 (Cal. 2006)
(wife needs good cause to access via discovery her husband's sexual "history" in her tort
claims on her HIV infection; even with access, appropriate confidentiality-via "in camera
review, orders to seal documents, protective orders and other measures"-must also be
insured).
247 See also ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1506 (2007), which says:
When the department seeks to establish paternity of a dependent child,
any inquiry about prior or current sexual activity of a recipient of public
assistance must be limited to that necessary to resolve a genuine dispute
about the parentage of a child. When a custodial mother has informed
the department that a particular man is the father of her child, the
department may make no further inquiry into her personal life unless
the man so identified has denied that he is the father of that child or he
refuses to cooperate.

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[36:207

involve sexual conduct outside the time of conception.24 8 Similarly, in a
marriage dissolution case inquiries about sex can be precluded, as when a
marital paternity presumption is not subject to rebuttal.249
The limits on nongovernmental actors who, during governmental
proceedings, seek information on the paternity of certain children from
non-mothers are similarly illustrated in both paternity and divorce cases.
In only some circumstances (i.e., relevance) might a mother's friends or
family members be questioned about the mother's sexual liaisons. So,
questions about a mother's sex acts are unauthorized when an alleged
genetic father (unwed man, or husband as presumed father) is estopped
from denying paternity due to lack of genetic ties (as when the time to
rescind a voluntary paternity acknowledgement has run, or when the
marital paternity presumption is irrebuttable or not then subject to rebuttal
because of estoppel).
In the wholly private realm, there are also limits on information
gathering relating to paternity when information is sought from the
mothers directly. For example, certain tort law principles foreclose private
actors from asking women about the paternity of their children at least in
some settings. There is the possible tort of "unreasonable intrusion upon
the seclusion of another" which encompasses "highly offensive prying into
the . . . affairs of another person" that involve "private" matters. 250 This
248

See, e.g., Fults v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. App. 3d 899 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (not

even incremental encroachment on privacy right to learn information which may lead to
relevant information is allowed without legitimate and overriding compelling state interest).
249 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7540-41(b) (West 2004) (husbands, children, and some
genetic fathers may not rebut resumption more than two years from the child's date of
birth). Of course, not all marital paternity presumptions may be irrebuttable, as when
denials of rebuttal opportunities infringe upon the constitutional rights of unwed genetic
fathers (who, for example, have stepped up to parenthood under Lehr, via actual parenting
or designations on birth certificates). See, e.g., Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 192
(Iowa 1999) (state constitutional due process liberty interest for unwed natural father in his
child, even when child is born into an intact marriage, as long as the natural father
demonstrates "a serious and timely expression of a meaningful desire to establish parenting
responsibility").
Of course, though information on paternity (and thus on very personal matters) is
subject to court-authorized investigation procedures (as depositions and interrogatories),
that same information may not be available to all outsiders to the litigation who wish to see
the results. See, e.g., Burkle v. Burkle, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 805 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (court
records in dissolution cases are presumptively open).
250 Lovgren v. Citizens First Nat. Bank, 534 N.E.2d 987, 988-89 (Ill. 1989) (declining
to determine the status of this tort though there were conflicting lower court decisions). The
(continued)
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(and any comparable) tort do not foreclose implementation of our
suggested paternity law reforms.
As well, in the wholly private realm there are limits on private
information gathering from non-mothers as to paternity. 25' Data may be
sought by phone calls, emails or in-person conversations. Again, tort law
principles can bar inquiries. For example, there is the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, typically involving extreme and outrageous
conduct (intentional or reckless).25 2 Here too, our suggested reforms are
not implicated.
It should also be noted that in the private realm, certain information
seekers may have greater inquiry opportunities. For example, the First
Amendment protections afforded the press seemingly allow newspaper
reporters to gather and employ data in ways unavailable to others. As an
illustration of this principle, the media has a well-recognized right to
253
disclose truthful information, even when the means used to obtain that
information are questionable. Dissemination by the press of private
information obtained illegally has been deemed protected by the First
Amendment when the information is a matter of public interest. In
Bartnicki v. Vopper 254 in 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court effectively allowed
the publication by the press of an illegally recorded cell phone
conversation between two union officials involved in a school district
negotiation. A tape of the conversation was provided to a member of the
media who then played the conversation on a radio program. 55 School
tort was recognized and applied in Mlynek v. Household Finance Corp., No. 00 C 2998,
2000 WL 1310666 (N.D. I11.2000) (no tort for creditors phone calls to alleged debtor
regarding nonpayment) and Schiller v. Mitchell, 828 N.E.2d 323, 328-29 (Ill. App. Ct.
2005) (no tort for neighbor's video surveillance of claimant's property).
251 See supra note 250.
252 Alvarado v. KOB-TV, 493 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2007) (New Mexico tort does not
include publication of truthful, albeit embarrassing or humiliating information; court also
reviews New Mexico invasion of privacy torts involving intrusion into seclusion and public
disclosure of private facts-which can embody "true but intimate.., facts ... such as
matters concerning... sexual life", but which is not implicated when there is "a legitimate
public interest in the information"). Of course, quite different are possible tort claims when
in soliciting information from non-mothers, the mothers are placed in a false light (i.e.,
publicized matter is false). See, e.g., Welling v. Weinfeld, 866 N.E.2d 1051 (Ohio 2007)
(invasion of privacy claim recognized after differing state approaches are reviewed).
253 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
254 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001).
2
55 Id. at 519.
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district contract negotiations garnered enough public interest so that
concerns about illegality were overcome.256
There is at least one case, however, where media publication of
truthful paternity information did violate the opportunities for mothers to
"control information about themselves." In that case, the media acted not
only under statutory mandates, but also in conjunction with court
proceedings so that state action was very clear. At the time of G.P. v.
Florida,257 Florida statutes 258 required publication in newspapers of
information on the sexual acts of women who were placing their children
for adoption. These laws, intended to notify fathers of their potential loss
of paternity rights and interests, were held unconstitutional. 259 A Florida
appellate court, employing strict scrutiny, held in G.P. in 2003 that the
state was required to show the statutes "serve a compelling state interest
and that they accomplish the intended result, i.e., notice to fathers, through
the use of the least intrusive means.' 260 The court ruled that the manner in
which the information was disseminated (i.e., newspaper publication)
violated the mothers' privacy right under the Florida constitution, 261 as
there was no compelling state interest and as the statutes were not narrowly
drawn to meet the legitimate state interest in notification.262
Not surprisingly, given Bartnicki and G.P., a government which
gathers information on paternity must secure that information by means
that limit, as best possible, its potential misuse. In PlannedParenthoodof
256

Id. at 535 (at least where the illegal recording was not undertaken by the media). See

also Jean v. Mass. State Police, 492 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2007) (applying Bartnicki to a woman
who posted on her website a tape of a police search illegally recorded by another, as the
search was a matter of public concern).
257 G.P. v. Florida, 842 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). The case and its
problematic aftermath are reviewed in Jeffrey A. Parness, Adoption Notices to Genetic
Fathers: No to Scarlet Letters, Yes to Good-Faith Cooperation, 36 CUMB. L. REv. 63
(2005) [hereinafter Parness, Scarlet Letters] (although finding G.P. correctly decided,
arguing that the General Assembly should not thereafter have relied on putative father
registries and paternity lawsuits to protect the paternity opportunity interests of unwed
fathers whose children are placed for adoption by unwed mothers).
258 G.P., 842 So. 2d at 1061-62; FLA. STAT. § 63.087(6)(f) and § 63.088(5) (repealed).
259 G.P., 842 So. 2d at 1063.
260
Id.at 1062.
261 Id. (FLA. CONST. ART. I, § 23 recognizes a natural person "has the right to be let
alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life").
262 Id. at 1063 (insufficient governmental interest to override "privacy rights of the
mother and child in not being identified in such a personal, intimate, and intrusive manner";
alternative and "more narrowly tailored" intrusions are not addressed).
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Southern Arizona v. Lawall,263 a federal appellate court considered an
Arizona parental notification statute covering minors seeking abortions.264
It was argued that the information conveyed under the statute violated a
minor's "privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of sensitive personal
information. ''265 The court stated: "Like the right to decide whether to
terminate a pregnancy, the right to informational privacy is not absolute;
rather, it is a conditional right which may be infringed upon a showing of
proper governmental interest., 266 The court concluded that there existed
legitimate interests and that the confidentiality provisions in place were
sufficient in their protection of information privacy rights.267 A few years
268
later the same appellate court, in Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden,
examined Arizona laws requiring both that abortion providers give
unredacted information on abortion services to a medical licensing board
and that there be complete access to that information by employees of the
Department of Health Services. 269 The court ruled that the scheme violated
the information privacy rights of patients. 270 The court was concerned with
the excessive opportunities for access to the records, saying that even "if a
law adequately protects against public disclosure of a patient's private
information, it may still violate informational privacy rights if an
unbounded, large number of government employees have access to the
information., 27' The problem was unfettered access. However, a scheme
evidently would be proper where a mother discloses information about the
possible or actual genetic father of her child only when it is relevant (and
perhaps critical) to a public or private inquiry, is narrowly tailored to
achieve the need for identification, and contains stringent safeguards on

264

Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2002).
ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(D), (F) (2007).

265

Lawall, 307 F.3d at 789.

263

Id. at 790.
Id.
268 Tucson Woman's Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531 (9th Cir. 2004).
269 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2301.02(B) and (C) (2007); ARIz.
ADMIN. CODE § 9-101511(A)(4)(b) and (c) (2007) (placed no restriction on employee access to unredacted
information); ARIz. ADMIN. CODE § 9-10-1504(B) (2007) (no nondisclosure requirements
for a board receiving the information.).
266
267

270
271

Eden, 379 F.3d at 553-54.
Id. at 551-52.
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access, including penalties for any breach.2 2 Illustrative is a provision in
the New Jersey Parentage Act which says:
Notwithstanding any other law concerning public hearings
and records, any action or proceeding held under this act
shall be held in closed court without admittance of any
person other than those necessary to the action or
proceeding. All papers and records and any information
pertaining to an action or proceeding held under this act
which may reveal the identity of any party in an action,
other than the final judgment or the birth certificate,
whether part of the permanent record of the court or of a
file with the State registrar of vital statistics or elsewhere,
are confidential and are subject to inspection only upon
consent of the court and all parties to the action who are
still living, or in exceptional cases only upon an order of
the court for compelling reason clearly and convincingly
shown.273
So, an American state's interest in identifying both genetic parents of a
newborn conceived as a result of consensual sex is usually deemed
substantial. These interests include preserving or providing for each parent
the opportunity to develop a parent-child relationship, identifying potential
health issues for the child, and establishing financial and emotional support
for the child. Precedents before and after Lehr and Whalen have regularly
recognized the legitimacy of these goals.
Constitutional information privacy cases involving inquiries into
paternity by, or supported by, government go beyond Lehr and Whalen. At
times, precedents employ the Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable

272

Pre- and post-Bartnicki information privacy cases in the federal circuit courts of

appeal are reviewed in Jessica Ansley Bodger, Note, Taking the Sting Out of Reporting
Requirements: Reproductive Health Clinics and the ConstitutionalRight to Informational
Privacy, 56 DUKE L.J. 583, 593-601 (2006).
273 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-42 (West 2007). This is similar to the restrictions placed by
courts on the dissemination and use of medical information relevant in a tort case where
informational privacy protection is deemed only partially waived. See, e.g., Brende v. Hara,
153 P.3d 1109, 1115-16 (Haw. 2007) (medical information privacy order in an auto
accident case guided by state constitutional information privacy interests).
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searches and seizures.274 The Fourth Amendment, however, does not
undermine our suggestions. The information on paternity sought from or
about new mothers is typically used solely for paternity identification and
parental notification purposes in reasonable ways. Access to the gathered
information is restricted to those persons directly involved in implementing
governmental policies on parenthood. Of course, Fourth Amendment
privacy protections do not encompass instances where information is
voluntarily revealed.275
State constitutional rights can also serve as independent, and
additional, sources of information privacy rights. For example, in 1998 in
Kunkel v. Walton, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the express state
constitutional protections involving "people" being "secure in their
persons" against "invasions of privacy" went "beyond federal
constitutional guarantees" so as to protect against unreasonable disclosures
of patients' "personal medical information. 2 76 Yet here, as with federal
constitutional precedents, there is little to restrain American governments
with legitimate interests in accessing information about children.27 7
Contemporary state and federal legislation demonstrate the significant
governmental interests in limiting or denying maternal control over
information about children. These laws, however, also protect against
unnecessary public and private disclosure of the personal information on
274 See generally

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633-35 (1886); Olmstead v.

United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967) (areas where persons have a reasonable expectation of privacy.)
275See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441-43 (1976) (bank records); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-45 (1979) (phone records).
276 Kunkel v. Walton, 689 N.E.2d 1047, 1055-56 (Ill. 1997).
277 See, e.g., id.at 1056 (it is reasonable to require a patient to disclose medical
information otherwise subject to state constitutional privacy protections where the
information is relevant to the issues in a lawsuit commenced by the patient). See also Jacob
B. v. County of Shasta, 154 P.3d 1003, 1012 (Cal. 2007) (state constitutional privacy right
can be infringed where there is a justified, competing interest; balancing shows "litigation
privilege" can bar otherwise appropriate state constitutional privacy law claim). Consider
as well that even when patients do not commence suits, they may still on occasion be
questioned (e.g., deposition or trial testimony) when their medical histories are relevant and
necessary (e.g., issues raised by other patients or by state licensing boards regarding doctor
competency) for more accurate fact-finding in suits involving others. See, e.g., United
States v. Westinghouse, 638 F.2d 570, 580-81 (3d Cir. 1980) (investigation into workplace
safety would allow government to obtain from an employer the medical records of many
employees; but, employees need prior notice and a chance to raise personal privacy claims
[which may lead to bars against certain disclosures to third persons]).
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children that is secured from mothers. For example, the federal Social
Security Act, which requires mothers seeking financial aid to cooperate in
good faith to establish paternity, mandates that expedited state paternity
procedures contain safeguards "on privacy and information security" that
apply to access opportunities to certain public records (including records
on marriage, birth and divorce).278
Similarly, state birth certificate laws limit maternal control, but also
limit the dissemination of collected information. For example, in Missouri
there is a duty for those in attendance at a birth, including medical
personnel, to record on a certificate of live birth such information as the
date, place and time of birth; the sex of the newbom; the mother's maiden
name, birthdate and birthplace; the father's name and date of birth; and, the
mother's weight before and during pregnancy. 279 But there is often also an
express confidentiality duty on those gathering information in order to
complete birth certificates. 280 Furthermore, information relevant to birth
certificates often may not be collected in the presence of anyone other than
personnel directly involved in providing care to mothers (usually hospital
personnel).2 8'
IV. SUGGESTED LIMITS ON MATERNAL DECISIONMAKING
In what ways might current laws be altered so as to better protect
paternal interests and rights, as well as to provide legal fathers for all
newborns and to promote other social policies on paternity (as parental
equality) while not unduly undermining maternal privacy?
In the safe haven setting, laws allowing at-will matemal (or any
parental or custodial) abandonments should be eliminated. There would be
very little cost, as the laws are largely unused. These laws send the wrong
message about fathers. In the alternative, newborn abandonments should
be allowed only where both legal parents (actual or potential) desire an end
to parenthood, as is done with adoption placements of older children.
In the adoption setting, placements should usually require truer (or at
least more informed) consent (actual or presumed) from both legal parents
(actual or potential) where the placed children are born to unwed parents as
27842 U.S.C. § 666(c)(1)(D) (2000).
279 Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 19, § 10-10.040 (2007) (interestingly, the mother's and the
father's names are requirements distinct from the "signature of parent").
280 See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 500.20(c) (2000); 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5550-470 (2003) (registrar holding birth certificate may only disclose it to someone having
"direct and tangible interest in the content").
281 See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 500.20(d) (2000).
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a result of consensual sex. Enhanced consent would be facilitated by better
prebirth education on the legal parentage consequences upon birth for both
women and men. After birth, adoptions should usually only go forward
after more significant, or new, paternity inquiries are made when the child
is fatherless.
As well, the consequences of inaccurate paternity
designations should be better understood, and, on occasion, prompt
increased employment of anti-perjury and other similar sanctions. And
often genetic ties should be investigated where serious questions are raised
about who has been designated a father under law. Howard K. Stem was
not the ultimate legal father of Anna Nicole Smith's daughter even though
he was named on the birth certificate. There was significant evidence that
he was not genetically tied even before the certificate was completed. The
state has strong interests (especially in child welfare, finality, and accurate
paternity records) that disallow suspicious designations of legal paternity
or legal fatherhood in other settings (e.g., adoption) that are solely based
on certifications by moms and alleged dads. "Good faith" cooperation in
naming fathers during government inquiries is now already required for
many unwed mothers seeking government aid for their children.282
In the birth record setting, public policies should better insure that both
married and unmarried mothers more accurately name legal fathers at
birth. Where mothers are married, in states where there are marital
paternity presumptions that are easily rebutted by a showing of no genetic
ties, married women should be better informed of the potential
consequences of designating (or allowing designations of) their husbands
as fathers when there is no biological connection and no actual or likely
parental relationship between husband and child.
Where marital
presumptions are difficult to rebut, husbands should better understand that
later proof of no genetic ties (and thus often of adultery by wives) may not
be enough to undo paternity obligations since DNA testing is not always
available or admissible.28 3 If the (sometimes stringent) state timing
requirements for rebuttal, as well as the differing state norms for differing
rebutters, were required to be communicated to all newly-designated
282 See, e.g., 42

U.S.C. § 654(29)(A) (2000); N.J.

STAT. ANN.

§ 2A:17-56.55 (West

2000) (applicants for Medicaid and public assistance, as well as Title IV-D benefits).
283 See, e.g., Cravens v. Cravens, 936 So. 2d 538, 542 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (wife could
not rebut with DNA the marital presumption earlier recognized in a dissolution order);
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124 (genetic father cannot rebut marital presumption; only husband
and wife may rebut, under limited circumstances per the state statute); and 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 45/8 (1993) (husband has 2 years to seek to rebut a marital presumption once he has
"knowledge of relevant facts").
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married parents,284 there should be little personal offense and a likely
deterrence of some nasty paternity battles long after the children and others
have developed family and other attachments (and detachments).
Where new mothers are married and where there are automatic
paternity presumptions for their husbands, the wedded couples should also
be better informed of the potential consequences if they are contemplating
additional methods of paternity designation. For example, where a
husband, who is already a presumed father, executes a paternity
acknowledgment, the standards for later paternity disestablishment can
become much more stringent. Thus, for a significant period of time in
Wyoming, a husband was able to disestablish his presumed paternity
(usually done during marriage dissolution) by showing no genetic ties, but
days if
could not disestablish his paternity by acknowledgment after sixty
'285
it was not "a result of fraud, duress or material mistake of fact.
When mothers are unwed, both signatories on birth certificates should
better understand the consequences. It is not generally recognized that
states vary significantly in their guidelines on overcoming non-marital
paternity arising from such birth records. All of these birth records are
seemingly guided by the single federal statutory directive that after sixty
days, rescissions can occur only upon proof of "fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact, with the burden of proof on the challenger" to establish the
28
paternity designation. 286 Yet depending on the state and on the reason for
challenge, there may be five years to act, ten years to act, or no written
time limit.
There are other potential misunderstandings by birth certificate
signatories. At times, but not always, laches or estoppel or a child's best
interest may preclude paternity disestablishment proceedings. And there

284

Further proposals on conveying better information to those considering voluntary

paternity acknowledgments (or other paternity designation acts) were recently made by the
Common Ground Project, reviewed in Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Fatherhood:
Welfare Reform, Child Support Enforcement, and Fatherless Children, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 325, 376 (2005).
285 DNW v. Dept. of Fain. Services, 154 P.3d 990, 994 (Wyo. 2007) (under the sinceamended WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-102). As the information we would like to see conveyed
is factual (i.e., legal requirements in the relevant state or states), is not a state's
"viewpoints" (i.e., does not contain "the state's moral and philosophical objections" to
contemplated acts), and does "promote independent decision making," we see no First
Amendment barrier.
286 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D)(iii) (2000).
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are even important interstate variations on the meanings of the federal
statutory terms of fraud, duress, and material mistake of fact.287
Where the legal consequences of parentage designations of both wed
and unwed fathers are known, but where mothers nevertheless prompt
erroneous paternity designations by affirmative deceit (and perhaps even
where there is only silence in the face of the recognized ignorance of
others), there should be consequences. Clearly, public policy does not now
allow unwed mothers to select amongst their male friends the best potential
fathers and then prompt paternity for the chosen men by lying about male
genetic ties. Similarly, in the adoption setting, unwed mothers cannot
alone designate the legal fathers or choose to proceed fatherless. Trial
judges who preside in paternity and adoption proceedings always seek to
promote traditional principles recognizing the importance of genetic ties
and to protect the best interests of children. Unfortunately, both within and
outside of the federal Social Security Act, there are insufficient deterrents
to prevent fraud or other misconduct by mothers who fail to name, or who
falsely name, the fathers of their children born in and outside of
marriage.288 Little is done when married or unmarried women lie about the
men who are and who are not the genetic fathers, Paternity rights and
interests are undermined, as are societal norms regarding the import of
genetic ties, the desire for two parents for every child born alive, and
children's interests in knowing about or having the chance to know about,
if not bond with, both genetic parents.
CONCLUSION
There should be differences in the laws governing abortion decisions
and the laws governing maternal decisions about children in safe haven
abandonment, adoption, and birth record settings. There are definitely
differences in societal concerns about protecting potential human life and
protecting born alive human life. For children as well (both actual and
potential), there are important differences in laws governing pre-birth and
287

On the differing state laws on rescinding voluntary paternity acknowledgments

under the federal law standards, see Parness, New FederalPaternityLaws, supra note 63, at
76-93.
288 On reforming the federal Social Security Act standards governing unwed
mothers
and voluntary paternity acknowledgments, see Parness, New FederalPaternityLaws, supra
note 63, at 93-97. On reforming state adoption laws when unwed mothers place their
children for adoption, see Parness, Scarlet Letters, supra note 257, at 76-80 (focusing on
the infamous Florida "Scarlet Letter" laws, invalidated in G.P. v. Florida, 842 So. 2d 1059,
1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003), and the subsequent Florida "Putative Father Registry" law).
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postbirth parenthood. There are differences between legal paternity rights
affecting interests in potential human life and legal paternity rights
affecting interests in children born alive. Accordingly, there should be
differences between the laws allowing for the termination of potential or
actual legal paternity before birth, and the termination of potential or actual
legal paternity after birth.
Unfortunately, many American safe haven, adoption, and birth record
laws reflect the abortion law policies that recognize relatively
unconditional respect for exclusive maternal decisionmaking. We do not
question Roe v. Wade here. Yet, when there are children born alive as a
result of consensual sex, maternal decisionmaking affecting legal paternity
should not always be promoted without regard for a child's best interests,
the legal paternity interests or rights, or the strong social policies, including
the favoring of two parents for each child born alive.

